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Not on speaking terms, but business as usual 




Since the crisis over Ukraine erupted, the relations between Russia and the EU have been 
characterised by the coexistence of a dominant paradigm of competition and cooperation in certain 
areas. How can we explain this ambiguity? First, a distinction is made between the multi-actor 
structure of low politics versus polarised discursive positions in high politics. Construal-Level Theory is 
invoked to explain how low politics are characterised by immediate, concrete images, while high 
politics are characterised by abstract, ideologised images. Second, the paper considers the interaction 
between both levels, exploring whether contagion is likely, either the spill over of cooperative 
practices from low to high politics or the trickling down of conflictual practices from high to low 
politics. It is argued that the chances of contagion from more cooperative practices to a paradigmatic 
repositioning and defrosting of EU-Russia relations is unlikely. 
Keywords: Russia, European Union, Construal-Level Theory, cooperation, conflict 
 
Introduction 
Since the Ukraine crisis erupted in late 2013, early 2014, the EU and Russia have found themselves in 
the deepest crisis since the end of the Cold War. Their Strategic Partnership was suspended. 
Sanctions and counter sanctions get renewed on a regular basis. Rhetoric on both sides is often 
sharp. Yet, in different specific policy fields, business seems to continue as usual. Trade has largely 
recovered. The import of natural gas has peaked. Educational exchanges still reach high levels. How 
can this ambivalence be explained? Why does business continue as usual, while Moscow and 
Brussels are  not on speaking terms, at least not within an institutionalised setting like the Strategic 
Partnership?  
To answer these questions, this article draws on the distinction between low and high politics. In low 
politics relations are based on multi-actor structures with diffuse interests. High politics, on the other 
hand, are characterised by a limited number of actors and strong paradigmatic positioning. 
Construal-Level Theory is used to explain the latter: greater psychological distance at the level of high 
politics leads to more abstract, essentialised ideological mental representations of the other, its 
behaviour and intentions. 
Though taking a different, social psychological, theoretical approach, this article engages with the 
same questions underlying the conceptual framework of ‘symbolic boundaries’ presented in the 
introduction to this special issue (Mérand and Dembinska). It acknowledges that patterns of 
cooperation and conflict in specific ‘geopolitical fields’ of EU-Russia relations are partly autonomous 
and have their own dynamics. On this basis the question is raised why the patterns of cooperation 
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and conflict are so fundamentally different in the (constructed) categories of low and high politics, or 
in terms of this issue’s conceptual framework why there is a gap between practices of conflict and 
cooperation between local geopolitical fields and the geostrategic macro-level. After that, the article 
deals with the vertical dimension. It investigates why bottom-up contagion from low to high politics 
has not occurred, as Liberal theories would expect. The other way around, it also considers the 
possibility of ‘reverse contagion’, top-down, from high to low politics. Related to this, it highlights 
attempts to reframe predominantly cooperative domains of low politics into issues of high politics, 
characterised by conflictual practices. The analysis draws in particular on the domain of EU-Russia 
energy relations to  illustrate these processes. 
The article argues that a contagion from the more cooperative levels of low politics to high politics is 
unlikely. Equally, turning issues of low into high politics is far from evident. Therefore the awkward 
combination of confrontation with diverse forms of pragmatic and selective cooperation may be the 
new normal in EU-Russia relations for a while to come. The staring contest which has characterised 
their relations over the last years may not come to an end soon. 
 
The paradox of EU-Russia relations 
When the EU and Russia embarked on a Strategic Partnership in 2003, this was accompanied by great 
optimism. The two parties agreed to cooperate in four common spaces: the common economic 
space; the common space of freedom, security and justice; the common space of research, education 
and culture; and the common space of external security.1 They put in place a highly institutionalised 
framework for their relations: with no other country was the EU meeting more frequently at the 
highest level than with Russia. Trade volumes increased sharply until the 2008 financial crisis. Yet, 
despite this growth and despite a continued pragmatic cooperation, tensions accumulated already 
well before the eruption of the Ukraine crisis (Haukkala 2015) and trust dwindled, resulting  in a ‘logic 
of competition’ (Casier 2016). Little progress was made, except for the largely symbolic Partnership 
for Modernisation of 2010. Brussels and Moscow did not manage to conclude a new agreement, as a 
follow-up for the 2004 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which was supposed to last 
until 2007 and since then is extended on an annual basis. Increasing competition and distrust 
spiralled out of control over Ukraine in late 2013, early 2014. The developments over the 
Euromaidan protests, the regime change in Kyiv, the Russian annexation of Crimea and its 
involvement in the war in Eastern Ukraine led to a suspension of the Strategic Partnership. The EU 
imposed sanctions, both economic and individual, and has renewed them every half year since then. 
The EU’s unity on maintaining sanctions against Russia has surprised many. Before the Ukraine crisis 
the Union was traditionally highly divided on Russia. Moscow retaliated with counter sanctions, 
targeting agricultural and food products mainly.  
For over six years, since the escalation of the Ukraine crisis, EU-Russia relations are in their most 
profound crisis since the end of the Cold War. Despite this deep crisis, there are some interesting 
ambiguities in current EU-Russia relations. One of them is in the field of trade. In 2015 the EU’s 
import of Russian goods dropped with -25.2% and its exports to Russia with -28.6%.2 In 2017, 
however, Russia recovered from its recession and problems in the financial sector and trade largely 
restored with +22.0% for imports and +18.8% for exports (DG Trade 2018). As a result, trade is now 
more or less back at the level it was before the Ukraine crisis, despite years of economic sanctions. 
The EU is still the first trading partner for Russia; Russia is the third trading partner for the EU. When 
looking at Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), 75% of FDI stocks in Russia come from the EU (Haukkala 
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2018, 54), though this includes Russian money kept in European banks and reinvested in the Russian 
economy.  
In the field of energy the import of Russian natural gas in the EU reached a new peak in 2016. Not 
less than 39.9 % of imported gas was of Russian origin, in comparison to figures fluctuating around 
one third before the Ukraine crisis. For crude oil this was 31.6 % (DG Energy 2018, 26). Energy 
relations remain of key importance to both parties. The potential volume for the transmission of 
natural gas is further increased by the planned Nord Stream 2 pipeline.  
In the field of education, cooperation remains strong, in particular in the field of mobility. From 2015 
to 2017 the EU has increased the budget for Erasmus+ cooperation with Russia to almost 80 million 
EUR. No country scores higher than Russia when it comes to short term student exchanges. From 
2015 to 2017 nearly 11,000 Russian and EU students participated in Erasmus+ exchanges. Over the 
same period 90 Jean Monnet projects were awarded to Russian institutions (European External 
Action Service 2017). 
The stalemate in EU-Russia relations has also not stopped frequent bilateral contacts between Russia 
and individual EU member states. There are hardly any heads of government or state from EU 
countries who have not made an official visit to Moscow. The other way around, president Putin has 
paid numerous visits to EU capitals and made a mediatised private visit to the wedding of Austrian 
Foreign Minister Kneissl. During official bilateral meetings, commercial relations often top the 
agenda. This suggests a certain division of tasks, whereby issues of political relations and security are 
left to the EU. Also at that level, EU-Russia, we have seen an increase of bilateral visits at higher level 
over the last years, usually at foreign minister level  or below. 
In 2016 the EU formulated its five guiding principles for relations with Russia. They consist of: the full 
implementation of the Minsk agreements; strengthening relations with Eastern partners, including in 
Central Asia; strengthening internal EU resilience (in particular energy security, hybrid threats, 
strategic communication); selective engagement with Russia; support for Russian civil society and 
people-to-people contacts. In particular selective engagement is worth noting. It implies that the EU 
and Russia continue to work together in areas where they have common interests and consider 
collaboration useful. This includes issues such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 
also known as the Iran nuclear deal, in particular after the American withdrawal in 2015. It is also the 
case for counter-terrorism. This principle has introduced a stretchable pragmatic element into the 
EU’s policy. Despite the deep crisis and sanctions, Brussels cooperates ‘as usual’ in selected fields. For 
other issues, such as the war in Eastern Ukraine, the EU has resorted to alternative channels, such as 
the Normandy format. It was within this setting that Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia negotiated 
and concluded the Minsk agreements, which were meant to put an end to the war in Eastern 
Ukraine. Richard Youngs argues that the EU seeks a balance between ‘bounded containment’ of 
Russia and trying to take into account its interests where possible (Youngs 2017, 220). 
The overall impression is that, five years after the Ukraine crisis erupted, EU-Russia relations are a 
mixed bag. There are substantive and lasting sanctions, profound distrust, harsh rhetoric. At the 
same time, there is selective engagement, extended bilateral relations and business as usual in areas 
like trade and energy. To understand this paradox, the next section will situate the issues of conflict 
and cooperation along the dichotomy of low versus high politics. It will be clarified how EU-Russia 
relations are fundamentally different at these levels and which implications this entails. In doing so, 





Low versus high politics 
The distinction between high and low politics in International Relations is an ill-defined one. High 
politics usually refers to issues of security or survival of the state, but also to conventional state-to-
state diplomacy. By extension it refers to all issues of geopolitical or strategic importance. Low 
politics, on the other hand, refers to relations in geostrategically less sensitive areas, such as 
commercial relations, cooperation on environmental matters, etc. In Realist literature the distinction 
assumes two things. First that both spheres are distinct and have their own autonomy (Barnett 
2011). Second, as the terms themselves indicate, a hierarchy is assumed whereby high politics are 
seen as what fundamentally matters, while low politics are of secondary importance. This has led to 
critique the distinction between low and high politics as a ‘false dichotomy’ (Ripsman 2005).  
In this article the terms are used in a different way from this Realist understanding, as a subjective 
categorisation in political discourse itself. What matters here is how policy makers or political leaders 
themselves categorise certain areas as of key strategic importance for the survival and core national 
interests of the state (high politics) or not (low politics). Also the supremacy of high over low politics 
is approached as a subjective category. Moreover, in line with the conceptual framework outlined in 
the introduction of this special issue, not only do the spheres of high and low politics have a relative 
autonomy. Also individual domains of low politics (‘geopolitical fields’ in terms of the special issue’s 
conceptual framework) have relative autonomy vis-à-vis each other, implying that they display 
varying patterns of cooperation and conflict (Mérand and Dembinska). 
Notwithstanding the difference in theoretical approach, some findings of conventional literature on 
high and low politics and on ‘issue politics’ are relevant to our analysis. In the ‘issue politics 
paradigm’ the issue position of key actors and decision-makers becomes itself the main dependent 
variable (Vasquez 1998, 378). Milner and Tingley even refer to the ‘shaping of high and low politics’ 
(Milner and Tingley 2015, 13) and how this is affected by domestic politics.3 This adds an element of 
construction of high and low politics to the issue areas literature, though it is not really developed 
theoretically by the authors. What is of interest to our analysis is thus how issues move discursively 
between the categories of low and high politics. Energy relations are a good case in point and will 
also serve as a case in this article. While conventionally seen as an issue of low politics, it can be 
elevated to high politics when it becomes seen as an issue of vital importance for the security of a 
state. This was the case with the OPEC oil embargo in 1973-74. It was also the case with the gas spats 
of 2006 and 2009 when several EU member states were cut off from Russian gas. Inside the EU this 
item was widely read as a security threat, requiring a strategic response. As a result it moved to the 
‘high politics’ agenda. 
Today EU-Russia energy relations are predominantly a low politics issue again, whereby most 
decisions taken have limited national strategic implications, are often of a rather technical nature 
and taken on the basis of routine. The interaction in the field of energy is between numerous actors, 
economic and non-economic, producers and consumers, in function of their own interests or 
preferences (Aalto et al. 2014). In other words, the daily practices of energy relations are constituted 
by millions of acts and decisions by a huge number of public and private actors. As a result, the 
interests are highly diffuse and driven by dispersed commercial interests rather than ‘high’ political 
national interests. In this area states often act as brokers and mediators for commercial contracts. 
Exactly this has remained unchanged in areas not affected by EU-Russia mutual sanctions.4 In other 
words, the daily practices of trade, energy relations, academic exchange, etc. take place within a 
complex multi-actor structure, characterised by direct interaction. The interests of this wide array of 
actors are diffuse.  
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A different image emerges when we look at high politics. Positions are taken by a limited number of 
actors, political leaders in the first place. They are governed by dominant, in this case diametrically 
opposed, discourses. EU leaders frame Russia – to different degrees – in terms of threat and as a 
state which has deviated from the EU’s guiding model. Russian leaders accuse the EU and the West 
to follow a policy of neo-containment (Putin 2014a) and to impose its ‘unilateral Diktat’ (Putin 2014b) 
on other countries. The EU is seen as part of ‘an elite club’ using the extension of the liberal world 
order as an instrument of ‘domination over everyone else’ (Lavrov 2017). 
What stands out in this process is the paradigmatic positioning of both actors. As Joan DeBardeleben 
has argued, the EU-Russia paradigm for interaction has shifted from a ‘greater/common Europe’ 
paradigm to one of ‘competing regionalisms’ (DeBardeleben 2018). Moscow puts itself on an anti-
hegemonic position. It openly challenges the EU’s imposition of its political and economic model and 
claims its right to make its own ‘sovereign’ choices. Brussels traditionally identifies with the position 
of ‘normative’ power, a non-geopolitical actor driven primordially by norms and values, rather than 
interests. The diverging narratives on both sides went through a process of escalation whereby 
positions got more entrenched and reactions more assertive. 
The contrast between direct relations in complex, multi-actor structures with frequent, routinised 
interaction versus the polarised paradigmatic positioning of political leaders in foreign policy 
discourses does not feature in most International Relations theories. As a result, many theories 
struggle to explain the discrepancy between more cooperative relations at the level of low politics 
and more acrimonious relations in high politics. Realism assumes there is a strict hierarchy of issues 
whereby security and survival of the state dominate. Liberal approaches, on the other hand, expect 
close cooperation in areas of low politics to produce common interests and ultimately a more 
cooperative context for high politics, something that has clearly not happened in the realm of EU-
Russia relations (Forsberg 2018). Here an alternative theory is presented which grasps this contrast 
better: Construal-Level Theory (CLT) (Trope and Liberman 2010). This theory offers a solid ground for 
explaining the difference between diffuse and often common interests at the level of low politics and 
strongly polarised discursive positions and disagreement at the level of high politics. CLT is a theory 
from Social Psychology. It starts from the idea that in order to think about something, we need to 
transcend the self and the immediate. We do this through the creation of mental representations or 
‘construals’. It argues that the ‘construals’ we create of objects, events or others, become more 
abstract (‘higher’) as the psychological distance from our direct experience grows. This distance may 
take different forms: social, spatial, temporal or hypothetical. The greater the distance along one of 
these dimensions, the more abstract the construal becomes: it is ruled by essentialised images, 
whereby the event or other is reduced to a few simple characteristics. The smaller the distance, the 
more concrete, specific (‘lower’) the construal is. In other words, ‘CLT contends that people use 
increasingly higher levels of construal to represent an object as the psychological distance from the 
object increases. This is because high-level construals are more likely than low-level construals to 
remain unchanged as one gets closer to an object or farther away from it.’ (Trope and Liberman, 
2010, 441) When determining one’s attitude towards something that is psychologically distant, it will 
be detached from the specific, local context or from the incidental attitudes or behaviour of others. 
Instead, it will be determined by abstract construals such as ideologies. These ideologies are 
abstracted from the reality of our direct experience and become the lens through which this 
behaviour is understood. It will be argued below that while interaction in domains of low politics 
implies small psychological distances and is therefore determined by the specific context and the 
direct experience of interaction with others, the level of high politics implies higher psychological 




The daily ‘low politics’ practices in trade, energy, academic mobility, interregional cooperation are 
driven by a multitude of actors who interact on a regular basis in a direct, very specific way, i.e. in 
terms of CLT, with small psychological distances. For example, in the field of energy, they interact as 
negotiators of commercial contracts, as technicians, as sales managers, etc. They have very specific 
interests or preferences (concluding a contract, solving a technical problem, selling a product) and 
are aware of those of the others (see Aalto et al. 2014). They see the other in a fairly concrete way, 
not in abstract images. As a result, their daily interaction will be less affected by abstract political 
images.5 High politics, on the other hand, happens exactly at the level of abstracted images of 
national interests. The behaviour of the other is judged in the first place on the basis of discursive 
representations and abstract images one has formed of the intentions of the counterpart. In a 
context of tensions, whereby distance grows further, abstract negative images easily get radicalised 
(Trope and Liberman, 2010). This makes political leaders more prone to stereotypical paradigmatic 
positioning and even enemy thinking.  
Again, this finding displays a parallel with the more conventional approaches to issue areas.  On the 
basis of empirical research and refining Rosenau’s ‘issue area typology’, Vasquez has argued that ‘as 
issues become more tangible they will become more cooperative, and as issues become more 
intangible they become more conflict-prone’ (Vasquez 1983, 188). This relation becomes more 
outspoken when certain variables are present. Intangible aspects of an issue, for example, will 
generate more conflict if there is ‘frequent contention over the issue’ and ‘it is not linked to other 
issues’ (Vasquez 1983, 189). The other way around, ‘issues with tangible ends and means … tend to 
be cooperative, especially when there is a high number of actors.’ (Vasquez 1983, 189).The logical 
question that emerges from this, is whether contagion is possible. Can concrete images from 
domains of low politics spill over into high politics and affect more abstract construals? And may 
more cooperative patterns in certain local domains of low politics in this away change more 
conflictual patterns in high politics? The other way around, do abstract construals at the level of high 
politics trickle down to domains of low politics and negatively affect patterns of conflict and 
cooperation? These questions will be dealt with in the next two sections. 
 
Contagion: a spill over of cooperative practices from low to high politics? 
Is a contagion of more cooperative practices from certain domains of low politics to high politics 
likely? Have the pragmatic interaction and links that exist at bilateral level the potential to produce a 
normalisation of relations? These questions deal with the vertical hypothesis presented in the 
introduction to this special issue (Mérand and Dembinska), more specifically a bottom up change of 
conflictual patterns at the geostrategic level through contagion by more cooperative practices in 
specific domains of low politics.  
Drawing on the theoretical perspective given above, Construal Level Theory, a bottom up contagion 
is unlikely because concrete low-distance images do not simply spill over into abstract high-distance 
images. As explained above, there is a strongly polarised discourse at the level of high politics, in 
which Russia puts itself in an anti-hegemonic position, while the EU legitimises its position on the 
basis of the threat posed by Russia.  
The very idea that intense economic cooperation and interdependence generate common interests 
and form the basis for interstate cooperation is a liberal  proposition. It was one of the core 
theoretical narratives about EU-Russia relations throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. 
Developments have proven this interpretation wrong (Forsberg 2018).6 Strongly interwoven 
economic interests at low politics level were unable to produce stable political relations between 
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Russia and the EU. Romanova has analysed how transgovernmental and transnational energy 
institutions were unable ‘to cushion the crisis’ (Romanova 2018, 73). Krickovic has even argued that 
interdependence in the energy sector has generated a security dilemma, rather than fostered 
cooperation. Both parties have tried to reduce respectively their demand and supply dependence, 
but this has triggered concerns on the other side of asymmetrical interdependence and insecurity 
(Krickovic 2015). 
As explained in the conceptual section above, this analysis sees the domains of high and low politics 
as constructed domains. This implies that issues get discursively defined by political actors as high 
politics or not. Whether an issue gets defined as belonging to the realm of high or low politics 
ultimately depends on the criterion against which domains of EU-Russia interaction are defined as 
vital or not to the interests of the Russian state or of the European Union.7 It is in these areas that 
Russia and the EU get entangled in a ‘logic of competitive influence seeking’: ‘the Kremlin vies with 
the West for influence, considering any loss of such influence ultimately as a threat to its role as a 
regional hegemon and its aspirations for global major-power status’ (Malyarenko and Wolff 2018, 
193). Areas where a loss influence is not seen by the actors as a threat to vital interests are 
understood as low politics.  
In the Constructivist tradition these vital interests are not exogenously given, but a social 
construction. Extending this to our social psychological CLT approach, the definition of an issue as 
vital interest is a function of the degree to which the construals of the other or the situation are 
abstract or concrete. In other words, the images held and the level of abstraction determine how 
they define the situation (when is rivalling influence threatening?), how they interpret the behaviour 
of their counterparts and attribute certain intentions to them. The latter is of particular importance. 
Intentions of the other are in interstate relations a classic uncertainty8, thus not based on concrete, 
direct experience. As a result, images about intentions are almost per definition ‘high distance’ and 
thus abstract. Related social psychological theories of attribution have argued that, in particular in a 
contexts of escalating tensions and high psychological distance, the actions of the other party are not 
understood in the first place on the basis of their actual behaviour, but on the basis of the intentions 
attributed to them on the basis of the abstract images formed (see for example, Kowert 1998). In the 
field of Russia’s relations with the West, where there is a disproportionate emphasis on intentions (in 
particular speculation about Russia’s long-term geostrategic intentions), this is of utmost importance.  
In sum, with uncertainty about intentions abounding in EU-Russia relations, negative abstract images 
at the level of high politics are unlikely to be affected by more positive concrete images in certain 
fields of, for example, economic interaction. Moreover, this polarisation has been entrenched 
through the dualistic structures which have taken form in Europe. This dualism refers to the two-
pronged institutions and structures of governance which have been created around the Euro-Atlantic 
Community on one hand and around Russia on the other. It is clearly visible in the security field 
(NATO versus the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, CSTO), as well as in the field of economic 
cooperation (Eastern Partnership versus Eurasian Economic Union). This type of dualistic structures 
tends to stimulate highly abstract images of the adversary and his intentions rather than mitigating 
them. Besides, dualistic structures imply the absence of a shared normative framework of agreed 
principles that underpins multilateralism (Ruggie 1982; Ruggie 1992). What we have witnessed is the 
gradual erosion of the shared post-Cold War framework, formulated in the ‘Charter of Paris for a 
New Europe’ of 1990 (CSCE 1990) and translated into various agreements and institutions 
afterwards. This thinning out of shared principles in relations between Russia and the West in 
general and the EU more specifically, risks to foster polarisation at the level of high politics, where 




Reverse contagion: the trickling down of conflictual dynamics from high to low politics? 
If bottom up contagion (from low to high politics) is unlikely, as argued in the previous section, how 
about top down contagion? Can specific domains of low politics be negatively affected by the 
conflictual patterns at the level of high politics? In other words, may the logic of competition at 
geostrategic level trickle down to specific, local geopolitical fields? 
A distinction needs to be made between deliberate political decisions introducing conflictual 
practices into domains of low politics versus spontaneous trickle down effects. The former is best 
illustrated through sanction regimes.9 Hereby political actors decide to introduce sanctions in specific 
fields of low politics, thus imposing a conflictual logic on these domains. The EU has progressively 
introduced sanctions since the Russian annexation of Crimea and has renewed them every half year 
since then. In the economic field, the restrictive measures concern inter alia Russian access to capital 
markets, to certain sensitive technologies in the field of oil exploitation and the implementation of 
certain cooperation programmes (Council 2019). Russian counter sanctions targeted the import of 
agricultural products from EU countries. These forms of extension of conflictual dynamics to local 
domains of low politics can be seen as extension by force. Interestingly they have not triggered a 
conflictual dynamic in other fields of low politics. Conflict over the Russia embargo against EU 
agricultural products, for example, has not spilled over to other fields of trade. As illustrated above, 
the total volume of EU-Russia trade has recovered  and is back at the level before the Ukraine crisis. 
The effects of the sanctions are thus divergent and have not led to a spill over of conflictual dynamics 
into other areas of low politics. 
On the other side of the spectrum is spontaneous top-down contagion: the trickling down of conflict 
dynamics from high politics into domains of low politics. Looking again at the area of EU-Russia 
energy relations, little can be discerned in case of trickling down effects. In contrast to the 
widespread speculation on the eve of the Ukraine crisis that Russia would cut off gas supplies in case 
of a conflict, energy relations between Russia and the EU have continued as normal since the Ukraine 
crisis (Stulberg 2015) and have clearly been approached predominantly as domain of low politics.10 
As indicated above, the import of Russian gas into the EU even broke a new record in 2016, hitting 
almost 40% (DG Energy 2018, 26). This absence of conflict stands in sharp contrast with the gas 
conflicts of 2006 and 2009. Twice Russia shut down gas supplies over debt issues with Ukraine, 
disrupting the supplies of natural gas to several EU member states. This caused a shock effect in the 
EU and led to calls for emergency measures and reinforced energy security. The events of 2006 and 
2009 did not repeat themselves after the last gas spat due to the signing of an Early Warning 
Mechanism between Russia and the EU. The mechanism was invoked on several occasions and 
prevented further escalation. Also the agreement on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in June 2015, a good 
year after the eruption of the Ukraine crisis, indicates that conflictual dynamics did not trickle down 
to the energy sector. Though controversial within the EU, Nord Stream 2 is a project based on 
cooperation between Gazprom and partners from different EU member states: Uniper and 
Wintershall from Germany, Engie from France, OMV from Austria and British-Dutch Shell. 
As explained, energy relations are characterised by their multi-actor nature, whereby a multitude of 
actors with their own interests and preferences interact and produce a high variety of particular 
intentions rather than clear collective intention (Aalto et al. 2014). A trickledown effect would imply 
that the multitude of individual intentions and practices are brought in line with a collective, 
consensus-based strategic goal. Given the many particularistic interests in the energy sector, 
commercial ones in the first place, this alignment would be extremely difficult. On top of that, there 
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was a shared, pragmatic understanding in both Brussels and Moscow that the disruption of highly 
important energy relations would inevitably damage economies severely. While the EU is strongly 
dependent on the supply of Russian natural gas, Russia is strongly dependent on demand from the 
EU (Casier 2016). 
However, there is a third possibility whereby the dynamics of high politics are not simply trickling 
down or imposed, but whereby a domain of low politics is discursively reframed as touching vital 
interests and thus relabelled as field of high politics. Again, this can be illustrated in the field of 
energy, this time on the basis of an external attempt to convert energy into an issue of high politics. 
More specifically, there has been tremendous American pressure on the EU to reduce supply 
dependence on Russian natural gas by buying US Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). The pressure is not 
new; it existed already under the Obama administration. But under the Trump administration it has 
taken unprecedented forms and is more ‘bullish and vocal’ (Mitrova and Boersma 2018, 35). US 
Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, stated: ‘The United States is not just exporting energy, we’re 
exporting freedom. … We’re exporting to our allies in Europe the opportunity to truly have a choice 
of where do you buy your energy from. That’s freedom. And that kind of freedom is priceless.’ (Perry 
quoted in Cama 2018). The American ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, threatened in a letter 
to German energy companies with sanctions against companies supporting the building of the Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline, for they are ‘actively undermining Ukraine’s and European security’ (Grenell 
2019). In a reaction to the American mounting pressure, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov spoke of ‘a 
big battle’: ‘the United States wants to use the current situation in order to separate Europe from 
Russia economy-wise and bargain for the most favourable conditions for themselves in the context of 
the ongoing negotiations on the creation of a transatlantic trade and investment partnership’ (Lavrov 
quoted in Mitrova and Boersma 2018, 36). In December 2019 the National Defence Authorization Act 
was approved in the United States, providing for sanctions on the companies involved in the 
construction of Nordstream 2. This led main contractor Allseas to withdraw from the project and 
provoked sharp reactions from Moscow, Brussels and Berlin.  
Behind the American framing of the European choice as one between Russian natural gas or 
American LNG, is a changing energy reality. The US evolves from a net importer to net exporter of 
energy. In 2019 it became the world’s third LNG player (EIA 2018, Stratfor 2018). In January-April 
2019 35% of American LNG export went to the EU and considerable increases are projected 
(European Commission 2019). American LNG imports have been increasing in Europe with 14% in 
2019, but companies are confronted with an oversupply on the European market. This puts them in 
direct competition with Russia and explains the drastic efforts of Washington to ‘break into’ the 
European gas market, in which Russia is the biggest player.11  
Self-evidently this is open for discussion, but there are strong indications that the main motive of the 
Trump administration is commercial rather than geopolitical: ‘It does seem like the current [Trump] 
administration is pushing European countries to wean themselves off Russian gas and switch to 
American gas in a move that would benefit American companies.’ (Mitrova and Boersma 2018, 35)  
In this case, geopolitical and security arguments are only a pretext to increase the American share of 
the gas market.12  
Whether American attempts are effective to turn the predominantly commercial issue of energy into 
a high politics issue on the basis of simple, abstract images of security and freedom, is a different 
question. As things look now, the US approach mainly seems to work in EU member states who have 
already made it a priority to drastically reduce their dependence on Russian gas. Poland, for example, 
increased its imports of American LNG considerably as part of its ongoing strategy to reduce 
dependence on Russian gas. It signed major deals with American LNG companies in 2018, amounting 
10 
 
to the equivalent of almost 40% percent of Polish gas consumption (Crooks 2018). Along the same 
lines, some actors within the EU continuously attempt to reframe energy relations with Russia in 
security terms and make it an issue of high politics. So far, at least until the American imposition of 
sanctions, they have been little successful. This stands in sharp contrast with the crisis atmosphere 
surrounding the Russia-EU gas conflicts in 2006 and 2009, when energy was framed as a high politics 
issue. 
To sum up, attempts are definitely undertaken to extend the conflictual dynamics of high politics to 
specific domains of low politics by reframing them as affecting vital interests. Yet, these attempts are 
not necessarily driven by geostrategic motives, but they may follow from particularistic motives, such 
as commercial interests. That success of these actions has so far been limited, seems to confirm the 
relative autonomy of different local domains of low politics. Reverse contagion, from high to low 
politics, does not occur easily in the absence of a political decision, for example to impose sanctions 
in these areas.  
 
Conclusion 
Relations between the EU and Russia display a major ambiguity. On one hand, relations are at their 
worst since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership has been 
suspended. Sanctions and counter sanctions are in place. Trust is at an all-time low and there are 
very few signs that the current staring contest may come to an end. On the other hand, bilateral 
diplomatic activity between Moscow and EU member states seems to flourish. Trade has recovered 
from the dip after the start of the Ukraine crisis. This is even more the case for energy. In 2016 a new 
record was hit for Russia’s share in EU natural gas imports.  
This confirms that even today, in a context of crisis, a simple paradigm of conflict still does not suffice 
to grasp the essence of EU-Russia relations.13 What needs to be explained is the ambivalence: the 
deep conflict between the EU and Russia going hand in hand with business as usual in some areas. 
This article explained this awkward combination on the basis of the distinction between low and high 
politics, understood here as subjective categories. The continued cooperation in fields labelled as low 
politics, like trade and energy, mainly results from the interaction between a multitude of actors 
(private and public) in a multi-actor structure. On the basis of Construal-Level Theory, this interaction 
was understood as relations of low psychological distance, i.e. dominated by rather concrete mental 
representations of the attitudes and behaviour of the other, based on direct experience. For 
example, in the conclusion of an energy contract, the images the parties hold of each other are 
specific and immediate. In high politics, on the other hand, the mental representations of the 
attitudes and behaviour of the counterpart, are characterised by high psychological distance. They 
are abstract, essentialised images of the intentions of the other. They are more disconnected from 
the daily ‘reality’ of interaction and governed by ideologised images and more prone to enemy 
thinking. The two parties thus tend to position themselves discursively in a strongly antagonistic way 
in areas which are framed as affecting vital interests. 
On the basis of the above, the article studied the possibility of contagion effects between domains of 
low and high politics against the background of Construal-Level Theory. Bottom-up contagion effects 
imply that (more) cooperative practices would spill over from domains of low politics into high 
politics. Reversely top-down contagion effects imply that (more) conflictual practices would trickle 
down from high politics to domains of low politics. Drawing on the case of EU-Russia energy relations 




In others words, there is little chance that continued cooperation in fields like trade and energy will 
lead to a shift in the foreign policy positions of Russia and the EU and defrost relations. This is the 
case because concrete low distance images do not easily contaminate abstract, high distance 
polarised images. The dualistic structures which exist in wider Europe help to maintain high 
psychological distance and entrench polarisation. On the contrary, we continue to face active 
attempts to turn issues of low politics into conflictual high politics issues. A case in point are the 
attempts of the Trump administration to frame the EU’s choice between Russian natural gas and 
American LNG not as a commercial one, but as a vital choice over security and freedom.  
In conclusion, the pragmatism that has survived in some specific areas, is unlikely to provide the basis 
for a U-turn in EU-Russia relations. Changing the polarised discursive positions of both actors and the 
abstract, high distance representations they have formed of each other will be an inevitable step. It is 
clear that this cannot happen overnight, but will require a long and winding road of trust building and 
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1 The cooperation in these four common spaces was translated into Roadmaps, agreed in Moscow in 2005 
(Roadmaps 2005). 
2 Russia’s global trade in goods dropped in 2015 by 19.7% (DG Trade 2018). 
3 Some authors have argued that domestic politics matter considerably for the issue position of leaders 
(Putnam 1988), a factor which is often related to the distribution of costs and benefits over domestic actors 
(Milner and Tingley 2015, p. 14). 
4 The same holds for student mobility and collaborative research projects: they result from a multitude of 
decisions by individual students and academics and as such do not imply high political decisions. 
5 For a more extended argumentation about low psychological distance in energy relations between Russia and 
the EU, see Casier 2016. 
6 Despite this negative evaluation Forsberg notes that interdependence ‘can be regarded as a factor that has 
prevented the parties from further escalating their confrontation’ (Forsberg 2018). 
7 Scholars themselves differ over what exactly Moscow defines as its vital interests and analysts have variously 
emphasised geopolitical control, power distribution, status or regime survival. See among many others: Götz 
2015, Mearsheimer 2014, Forsberg 2014, White 2018. 
8 Rathbun argues that uncertainty is central to all traditions in International Relations theory, but is understood 
differently across them (Rathbun 2007). 
9 On sanctions between the EU and Russia, see inter alia Romanova 2016. 
10 Note that this also contrasts with the gas spats of 2006 and 2009 when the disruption of Russian gas supplies 
to some member states sent shock waves through the EU and became seen as an issue of high politics. 
11 In terms of the effects of an increased presence of US LNG on the EU energy market, it has been argued that 
the increasing American share is unlikely to outcompete Russia, but rather to make the European gas market 
more competitive and flexible (Mitrova and Boersma 2018). 
12 Geopolitical motives need to be distinguished from the geopolitical ‘wrapping’, i.e. the use of geopolitical 
and security arguments to gain commercial benefit, as described in this article. As to the former, it has been 
argued that Russia has the geopolitical objective with Nord Stream 2 to bypass Ukraine. In the case of Southern 
routes, both the EU (with the Southern Gas Corridor) and Russia (with Turkstream) had geopolitical objectives 
(Siddi 2019). 
13 A similar statement was made before the Ukraine crisis in Casier 2012. 
 
